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THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – This paper tries to explain why many socially-responsible firms appear to 
converge on a standard set of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices instead of 
striving to differentiate themselves from rivals and achieve competitive advantage. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Three explanations of this convergence are presented: herd 
behaviour, institutional isomorphism, and strategic cooperation. The different empirical 
predictions of these theories are laid down. The resulting framework is used to analyse a 
recent self-regulatory scheme launched by the steel industry, in which knowledge-sharing was 
used to stimulate poor performers to curb carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Findings – Social practices of firms are very often driven by pressures to conform, instead of 
pressures to perform. Even firms that want to be innovative may be forced by stakeholder 
requests to adopt passive and imitative behaviour. 
 
Practical implications – The paper suggests that there are two types of CSR – convergent 
and divergent – and that firms need to establish which type of CSR best fits their needs before 
they address the issues raised by stakeholders. 
 
Originality/value – The literature on CSR focuses on the relationship between stakeholders 
and single firms. The paper tries to add to this literature by analysing the relationship between 
stakeholders and industries. The paper also contributes to the debate on the financial benefits 
of CSR by arguing that in industries where the convergent type of CSR is dominant 
researchers should not expect above-average returns for socially-responsible firms. 
 
Keywords – Corporate social responsibility, strategy, institutional isomorphism, herd 
behaviour, cooperative behaviour, private regulation. 
 
Paper type – Conceptual. 
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THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICES 
 
1. Introduction 
The rise to prominence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the modern economy and 
in the management literature has been one of the most notable global trends over the last 
twenty years. Because of increasing public concerns for the natural environment, for the 
respect of human rights, for the ethical aspects of business and for other social issues, firms 
have multiplied their efforts to deal with their responsibilities to society. According to KPMG 
(2008), 80% of the Global Fortune 250 firms now release corporate responsibility information 
(up from 50 percent in 2005), and 75% have a formal corporate responsibility strategy in 
place. Correspondingly, scholars have developed a vast range of theories and concepts about 
how a firm should address the social issues involved in business operations (Melé, 2008). 
Different schools of thought have proposed different and competing constructs, which cover a 
similar territory as CSR, like “corporate citizenship”, “sustainable business”, “corporate 
social performance”, and others (Crane et al., 2008). 
In all these ramifications, one of the central tenets of the literature has been that a 
business case exists for embracing socially responsible behaviour. Instrumental stakeholder 
theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) suggests that CSR can add to the bottom line of a firm, 
thanks to the beneficial influence that CSR can exert on the relationships with stakeholders. 
The general idea is that when stakeholders observe a firm’s responsible behaviour, they will 
consider that firm a preferred party to have transactions with (Barnett, 2007). Stakeholder 
goodwill will allow the firm to get easier access to strategic resources, to reduce operating and 
transaction costs, and to boost its reputation in the market-place. 
This idea implies that socially-responsible firms should compete for stakeholder 
goodwill and try to differentiate themselves from competitors, as is usually the case when 
firms want to achieve a competitive advantage. Even when a firm invests in CSR because of 
3 
ethical considerations, and not with an immediate profit objective, the firm should rationally 
try to do so in ways that combine business opportunities and social welfare. According to 
Porter and Kramer (2006: 88), there is no reason why CSR should follow different rules from 
other strategic endeavours: 
 “For any company, strategy must go beyond best practices. It is about choosing a 
 unique position – doing things differently from competitors in a way that lowers costs 
 or better serves a particular set of consumer needs. These principles apply to a 
 company’s relationship to society as readily as to its relationship to its customers and 
 rivals”. 
A CSR-based strategy can lead to above-average returns only when rivals can’t imitate 
it (Reinhardt, 1998). However, many socially responsible firms do not actively differentiate 
their social behaviours from the ones adopted by rivals. Instead, these firms converge to a 
well-defined set of practices. The evidence can be found in the wide adoption of industry 
codes of conduct, certified management standards or principles written by various 
international organisms (Waddock, 2008). While firms that adopt these practices may 
demonstrate their dedication to social welfare, it is hardly a means for them of surpassing 
rivals. 
Why do many firms that invest in CSR make no claim to being unique? A possible 
answer is that the CSR concept is relatively new and firms may have not fully grasped its 
strategic potential yet. This answer conflicts with the fact that some industries have been 
under pressure from stakeholders for decades and still do not show signs of competition in 
CSR practices. Examples are the chemical industry and the steel industry, which we will 
discuss in a later section. These are industries where the social issues are deeply ingrained in 
the value chain, where chances for differentiation clearly exist but firms prefer to converge on 
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industry schemes or certification standards. Therefore, the reasons for the convergence must 
be deeper.  
In this paper I suggest that the social activities of firms are very often driven by 
pressures to conform, instead of pressures to perform (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). There 
are at least three theories about the kinds of pressure that push firms to converge. 
(1) Herd behaviour: convergence is stimulated by the uncertainties and ambiguities 
that surround social issues and the correct way for a firm to respond to them. Information 
externalities are the main driver of the diffusion of practices. 
 (2) Institutional isomorphism: convergence is seen as the result of legitimacy-seeking 
efforts by firms, which try to conform to what regulators, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and other stakeholders define as appropriate behaviour. 
 (3) Strategic cooperation: when the stakeholders are unable to observe the actual 
social or environmental performance of the firms, single offenders in an industry can damage 
the reputation of their peers; to avoid indiscriminate penalties from stakeholders, industry 
members will try to build informal private regulatory schemes and will share knowledge and 
best practices with sub-performers in order to facilitate convergence. 
I compare the three theories and analyse their different empirical predictions. I also 
present the case of an industry – steel-making – where the players have always tried to 
coordinate their efforts in response to environmental risks and to deal with stakeholder 
pressures as a group. Differences of environmental performances among the various steel-
makers clearly exist but, as we will see, best performers seem more inclined to help sub-
performing rivals to reduce emissions than to protect their advantage from imitation. 
The main implication of the paper is that there are two types of CSR, convergent and 
divergent, and that scholars need to draw a neat line between them if they want to avoid some 
of the typical shortcomings of CSR research, especially when the question of the “business 
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case” is involved (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). I also try to show that, while the CSR literature 
usually focuses on the relationship between a single firm and its stakeholders, interactions 
among competing firms are relevant to CSR, because stakeholders often put pressure on 
whole industries, and not on single firms. 
 
2. Herd behaviour: is CSR a fad? 
CSR has gradually evolved from a vague awareness of the participation of firms in a network 
of social relations to a more precise set of issues and solutions (Smith, 2003). Several 
contrasting approaches to the study of the social responsibility of firms have emerged over the 
years (Carroll, 2008). In all of them, however, the concept that social responsibility has to do 
with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) has always been at the forefront. Another idea almost 
universally accepted is that social responsibility involves a response to needs defined outside 
(but not necessarily without the contribution of) business. In this paper I do not delve into 
definition problems but stay with the simple definition of the European Commission 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001), which describes CSR as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
on a voluntary basis”. 
The growth of interest in CSR has been accompanied by a tumultuous development of 
management tools. Today, firms that want to become more socially responsible can adhere to 
a range of programmes sponsored by states, NGOs or industrial associations. When we speak 
of convergence of firms’ social behaviours, we refer to the decision of many firms to adopt 
one or more of these programmes, instead of going it alone and devising their own way to 
deal with stakeholder expectations. These programmes include, for example: 
(a) codes of conduct (such as US Apparel Industry Code of Conduct); 
(b) certified management standards (such EMAS or ISO 14001 series); 
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(c) partnerships with governmental organisations (e.g. UN Global Compact), NGOs 
(e.g. Marine Stewardship Council), or peers (e.g. Global Business Coalition for HIV/Aids); 
(d) market solutions to achieve social or environmental performance (such as buying 
credits to obtain carbon-neutrality). 
All these programmes allow firms to address serious issues and to improve their 
performance in the field of environmental protection, human rights and the like. They also 
contribute to firm reputation. But they do not allow a firm to be unique or to appropriate 
exclusive resources and protect them (Barney, 1991). The best that firms can expect from 
these programmes is to align themselves with the best practices of their industry. 
Zucker (1987: 26) observed: “Few innovations are widely adopted, by organizations or 
elsewhere, with most looking more like the sociological characterization of ‘fads’ than social 
change”. So, can the convergence of social behaviours of firms be the result of imitation? Or, 
in other words, is CSR a fad? Convergence of practices via imitation can be produced by 
information externalities: the convergence happens when rivals are uncertain about which 
practices are most appropriate and focal firms are credited with superior information about the 
best way to address a given issue. The resulting imitative process can be described as “herd 
behaviour”. Theories of herd behaviour have been proposed to explain a variety of 
phenomena, such as anomalies in stock prices, waves in takeovers, or fashions in the 
consumer market (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). 
The representative application of herd behaviour theories to management studies is the 
diffusion of innovations. “Bandwagons” in particular have been considered an important 
mechanism (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Bandwagons are diffusion processes where 
organisations adopt an innovation not because it is efficient but because they feel the pressure 
of the sheer number of organisations that have already adopted it. 
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Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) distinguish two kinds of pressure. The first is 
institutional pressure: it happens when non-adopters fear to appear different from the majority 
of their peers. This kind of pressure is actually a case of institutional isomorphism, which is 
discussed in the next section. The second kind is competitive pressure, which occurs when 
non-adopters fear the risk of below-average performance if the adopters profit from the 
innovation.  In this case, non-adopters finally adopt the innovation because they do not want 
to discover that the innovation is efficient only after adopters have obtained first-mover 
advantages. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) suggest that innovations are more likely to 
induce bandwagons when the returns from the innovation are ambiguous. Three types of 
ambiguity are important: 
(1) ambiguity of goals: the goals pursued by the innovating organisations are relatively 
unclear; 
(2) ambiguity of means-ends relations: the possible outcomes of the innovation are 
doubtful; 
(3) ambiguity of environments: the probabilities of the relevant environmental states 
are uncertain. 
Ambiguity of all three types moderate the impact of the number of adopters on the 
intensity of the bandwagon pressures. When there is ambiguity, managers cannot confidently 
foresee the outcomes of their actions and are more sensitive to the risks of deviating from the 
consensus. Therefore, the greater the ambiguity, the greater the pressure coming from a given 
number of adopters. 
CSR practices seem good candidates for bandwagons, since they are often 
characterised by high ambiguity. How social issues must be addressed by firms and what 
penalties the stakeholders will impose on whoever fails to address those issues properly is 
typically uncertain. What is ethical or not in business is subject to the vagaries of media 
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scrutiny and political interpretations; whether or not stakeholders will be satisfied by a certain 
practice may be unknown; accidents can change the public perceptions of a firm in 
unexpected ways. It is therefore easy to imagine that firms that have to deal with a given 
social issue will take the safest route and align their behaviours to the practices already 
adopted by rivals who have had to address the same issue in the past. 
Bandwagon models, however, generate predictions that do not seem to fit well with 
the CSR practices of the real world. 
(1) The bandwagon process is supposed to involve industry members (innovators and 
imitators); there is no place for external actors that exert pressure on firms to accelerate the 
adoption. On the contrary, in the case of CSR it is clear that stakeholders exert pressure and 
are able to sanction firms that do not adhere to the best practices. 
(2) In bandwagon models the innovation is supposed to come from firms. In the case 
of CSR, however, stakeholders are often very active in writing standards and recommending 
practices; as a matter of fact, some of the most frequently-adopted standards, e.g. SA8000 or 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), have been developed by independent organisations. 
(3) Adopters have no incentive to facilitate the diffusion of the innovation. On the 
contrary, in the CSR realm leading firms and industrial associations frequently try 
deliberately to promote innovation among non-adopters. 
While, then, a “CSR fad” may explain some of the existing practices, bandwagons are 
not a satisfactory explanation for the convergence of firm social behaviours. The kind of 
processes that bandwagons activate depend exclusively on firms competing against each 
other; in contrast, industry codes of conducts, certified management standards and other best 
practices in the CSR areas often involve deliberate cooperation among firms in the same 
industry, or between firms in the industry and stakeholders. A firm that does not adopt a 
recommended practice risks stakeholders sanctions, and not simply to lag behind competitors. 
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Therefore, stakeholder interventions and cooperation among peers should be taken into 
consideration to explain why firms are reluctant to go their own way in dealing with social 
issues. 
 
3. Convergence as the result of institutional isomorphism 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) focuses on the 
pressures and the constraints of the institutional environment that limit organizational choices. 
Institutions include governments, courts, professions, interest groups, public opinion and 
other subjects interested in the behaviour of organizations. According to institutional theory, 
organizations can survive and attain their ends only if their actions are legitimate. Legitimacy 
is the generalised perception that the actions of an organisation are appropriate, given some 
socially-construed system of norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is provided by 
the institutional environment in which an organisation is embedded. The institutional 
environment expresses assumptions, beliefs and expectations; organisations try to obtain 
stability and legitimacy by satisfying the requirements imposed on them. Legitimacy leads to 
isomorphism between requirements and the organisation. In turn, isomorphism leads to 
homogeneity among organisations. 
DiMaggio and Powell portray three mechanisms that force organisations to adapt to 
their institutional environment. 
(a) Coercive isomorphism: pressures exerted by members of the institutional 
environment, accompanied by direct prescriptions (in the form of rules, norms or laws) and 
sanctions. 
(b) Mimetic isomorphism: attempts of organisations to infer legitimating practices 
from the behaviour of their peers. 
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(c) Normative isomorphism: patterns of thought, norms and models of organising 
spread by educational and professional institutions.  
It is important to underscore that mimetic isomorphism, as defined by institutional 
theory, does not coincide with herd behaviour. Mimetism provides legitimacy (Deephouse, 
1996); it is not driven by a search for efficient practices. Mimetism is effective because 
observers in the institutional environment take what is done by the majority of organisations 
as a standard of behaviour and evaluate the other organisations as deviant when they do not 
conform to it. It is not always easy to tell herd behaviour from mimetism in practice, however, 
because mimetism is expected to happen in the same situations where herd behaviour is also 
probable, that is, when managers face ambiguous situations, since in these situations 
legitimacy can be crucial for organisational survival. 
Many scholars have recently proposed institutional-theoretical explanations of why 
firms adopt CSR (Campbell, 2007; Marquis et al. 2007; Teerlak, 2007). The mechanism they 
consider dominant is coercive isomorphism. For example, Teerlak (2007) sees certified 
management standards (CMS) as an explicit effort by institutions to shape firm behaviours. 
However, mimetic and normative isomorphism in the areas of CSR are also documented 
(Matten and Moon, 2008). Reporting standards, such as GRI, that detail the parameters on 
which the organizational social performance must be evaluated (Waddock, 2008) can be a 
further driver of convergence. GRI seems to fall in the normative isomorphism category, 
because it specifies a way of thinking about the responsibilities of firms that comes to be 
essentially taken for granted in the relevant institutions.   
In general, institutional theory sees CSR as the consequence of a political process 
whereby NGOs, states and other stakeholders put pressure on firms to adopt given social 
practices and apply legal, social and economic penalties to non-adopters. Convergence of 
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firms is explained as homogeneity owing to their being embedded in the same institutional 
environment. 
There are many cases where firm social practices have actually been deliberately 
shaped by powerful stakeholders. Bartley (2007) provides a very careful analysis of two 
programmes: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which was the first system for certifying 
forests as environmentally well-managed, and the Apparel Industry Partnership/Fair Labor 
Association (AIP/FLA), which was created to monitor and certify that firms complied with a 
set of labour standards. Both cases show clearly that institutions are able to shape the 
behaviour of firms. 
For example, FSC was fuelled by public concerns about tropical deforestation in the 
late 1980s. These concerns led to timber boycotts, which activated a complex political 
process. NGOs like Friends of the Earth asked governments to propose a system for certifying 
sustainable forest timber. At the same time, hundreds of European municipalities and some 
European countries passed restrictions on the import of timber. Austria was a protagonist in 
this process: in 1992 the Austrian Parliament imposed a ban against all tropical timber that 
was not sustainably produced. Subsequently, Austria endorsed certification systems and 
financed FSC together with Switzerland and the Netherlands. The Ford Foundation, the Pew 
Charitable Trust and other foundations also intervened to finance the initiative. 
FSC was therefore mainly created by stakeholders. Industrial associations eventually 
adopted the scheme, but only after it had already gained legitimacy and financial support. As 
Bartley observes, this case demonstrates that stakeholders often act as institutional 
entrepreneurs and directly create forms of private regulation that constrain firm behaviour. 
There are clues, however, that, like herd behaviour, institutional isomorphism is not 
the whole story. Institutional theory often depicts organisations like passive paws that adapt to 
institutional pressures without reactions (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007). It is true that 
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scholars have tried to extend the theory to accommodate agency and firm efforts to change or 
influence the institutional environment (Oliver, 1991). Teerlak (2007) explains how firms can 
strategically react to private regulations that impose social practices. But, if firms are able to 
fight against institutional pressures, they should also be able to initiate self-regulation 
programmes when they find them efficient (e.g. preferable to public regulations in the shape 
of command and control). 
 
4. Convergence as the result of strategic cooperation 
Reputation is strategically important when observers are not equally informed about a firm’s 
“type”. In Game Theory, a player’s type is the set of privately-known information about that 
firm (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). Each player knows its own type, but it is uncertain about 
the types of the other players. All players will try to judge the type of rivals on the basis of 
past observations and other signals. 
Literature on reputation usually assumes that all the signals of player-type come from 
the player herself or from monitors that reveal information about her. For example, Fombrun 
and Shanley (1990) say that reputation is built from information about a firm’s activities 
originating from the firm itself, from the media and other sources. But it is common for 
observers to try to judge firm-type on the basis of information about other firms that they 
think are in the same class as the one in which they are interested. 
Reputation externalities arise when observers use actions by player A to infer the type 
of player B, on the assumption that A and B are members of the same reference group. 
Industry is the first kind of reference group that comes to mind, even though observers may 
often infer similarities in other classes of firms, e.g. multinational enterprises or firms from 
the same countries.  
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Reputation externalities are relevant to CSR because the stakeholders of a firm need to 
determine its “social responsibility type”. Owing to information asymmetries, stakeholders 
will often be unable to observe the actual social performance of the firm. Stakeholders 
therefore need to extract information from a variety of sources. Many historical cases suggest 
that the stakeholder can interpret the information involuntarily revealed by an offending firm 
as a signal about the other firms in the industry. For example, the Union Carbide accident 
damaged the reputation of the entire chemical industry; the Three Mile Island accident 
spreaded suspicion about all nuclear energy plants; the Exxon Valdez oil spill put in bad light 
all the major oil companies. 
King et al. (2002) discuss reputation externalities in the context of industries that find 
themselves “tarred with the same brush”. The authors present reputation as a common 
resource shared by all the members of an industry. As is the case with other kinds of shared 
resources, industry reputation may be overexploited by members and suffer from the “tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). When information about the social impact of each firm is 
costly to acquire, stakeholders identify a whole group of firms as culprits. 
One of the ways to solve the reputation commons is to privatise reputation (King et al., 
2002). The socially-responsible firms that do not want to be tarred with the same brush as 
their inferior rivals may try to develop unique reputations and distance themselves from the 
rest of the pack. For example, these firms may ally with reputed stakeholders or form elite 
clubs with other above-average performers. 
An alternative solution is to pressure other firms in the industry to improve their 
performance. Benchmarking networks and other forms of knowledge- and information-
sharing can be used to help laggards to adopt the best social practices. Since these solutions 
raise problems of collective action (Olson, 1965), however, they need to be assisted by 
coercion or other institutional devices. Private regulation, in the form of certification schemes, 
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codes of conduct and the like, can be one of these institutional devices. Private regulation 
allows firms to divide the industry reputation between “good” and “bad apples”, so that free 
riders are excluded from the benefits of the improved reputation created by the regulatory 
scheme. Private regulation is also a means to provide credible information about the actual 
social performance of firms, because the scheme is typically managed and monitored by 
external parties. Finally, private regulation avoids socially-responsible firms finding 
themselves at a market disadvantage, because the scheme forces all the firms to adopt the 
same practices and sustain the costs that may be connected with improved social performance 
(Bartley, 2007). 
The result of private regulation is that firms converge on reputable social practices 
imposed or adopted by industry charters or other self-regulatory bodies. This kind of 
convergence is strategically motivated and therefore has at least a couple of traits that are not 
expected under institutional isomorphism theories. 
(1) Although in institutional isomorphism the convergence is stimulated by 
stakeholders, in strategic cooperation based on reputation externalities it is stimulated by 
firms in the industry or in the reference group. In particular, the process will be started by 
firms that have the most to lose from the tarnishing of the industry’s reputation. These firms 
may have made large specific investments in the industry or may fear stakeholder attacks 
because of their notoriety (Knight, 2007). They are not necessarily the firms culturally most 
attentive to social issues. 
(2) When strategic cooperation is the main motivation of convergence, the firms will 
have the incentive to reduce the costs of imitation for their sub-performing peers. This 
behaviour has no direct explanation in institutional theory, where single firms lack any 
interest in solving their rivals’ legitimacy problems. 
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There are industries where the convergence of firms on management standards or 
codes of conduct shows these traits. An example is the Responsible Care programme of the 
chemical industry, which was initiated by industry members and includes explicit efforts to 
align the performance of all firms with minimal standards (King and Lenox, 2000). Another 
example is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a programme of the 
diamond industry to ensure the legitimate sourcing of diamonds. The programme aims to 
solve the issue of the “blood diamonds”, which are illegaly extracted by African paramilitary 
groups to finance revolts against legitimate governments. De Beers, the most visible player in 
the industry, was the major sponsor of the programme. De Beers directly financed the creation 
of the World Diamond Council, the industry organism that developed the programme in 
conjunction with African governments and NGOs (Kantz, 2007). In the next section I will 
describe some recent developments in the steel industry that are also suggestive of a strategic 
cooperative effort to avoid reputation externalities. 
 
5. Strategic cooperation in the steel industry 
The steel industry has a vast impact on the natural environment because of the various 
physical and chemical processes involved in the production of steel. This impact has been 
dramatically reduced in the last twenty years through technological innovation and efficiency 
improvements. Such progress affected all the stages of steel-making, from the reduction of air 
emissions to the treatment and recycling of the large amounts of water needed to obtain steel. 
There are, however, clear differences in environmental performances among the various steel-
makers. China, for example, which accounts for more than one third of the global steel 
production, has many “dirty” and inefficient mills (Park, 2008). 
Nevertheless, steel-makers have always tried to coordinate their efforts in dealing with 
pressures from environmentalists and governments. This collaborative approach has recently 
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found new expression in the response of the steel industry to the climate change issue (Marsh, 
2007). Steel-making, which generates an estimated 4-5 per cent of global carbon dioxide 
(CO2), is one of the major causes of global warming. The amount of emissions is bound to 
rise with the increase in the volume of production in the next decades. Global demand for 
steel is expected to double by 2050, while prevention of climate change will require steel 
makers to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% by the same date. Steel-makers 
recognize the need to cut emissions, even though they have constantly opposed regional cap 
and trade policies such as those used in the EU and would prefer a focus on improving 
emissions per unit of production worldwide. 
As part of the industry efforts to curb emissions, in October 2007 the International 
Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) announced a plan to gather emission data for steel plants 
industry. IISI, that has subsequently changed its name to World Steel Association, is an 
industry organism representing 18 of the world’s 20 largest steel-makers. The plan is aimed at 
gathering data from a large number of participating members and is subject to two limitations: 
(1) the data will be shared among members without identification of individual plants or 
producers; (2) the data will not be published or otherwise made known to external observers. 
The logic behind these constraints is to avoid discouraging potential participants, and 
especially the sub-performing ones, from joining the plan. 
The World Steel Association hopes to arrive at a comprehensive view of which plants 
around the globe are good at limiting CO2 emissions and which are not. The immediate 
benefit to each participant is to find out whether their emissions are below the industry 
average, taking account of factors such as plant size, technologies adopted, and so on.  
It is difficult to explain this data collection plan by herd behaviour or institutional 
isomorphism; of course there are strong public pressures on firms to reduce CO2 emissions 
but the particular plan adopted by the World Steel Association is a voluntary collective effort 
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and was not requested by external institutions. Indeed, the attitude of NGOs to the plan has 
mainly been critical. For example, Sustainability (a UK-based environmental group) lamented 
the fact that the scheme will not make the data publicly available. Given these hostile 
reactions from NGOs, the plan does not seem to be a means of legitimisation. 
On the contrary, this plan can be easily explained as the result of strategic cooperation 
among firms that want to defend industry profitability. One important fact in support of this 
interpretation is that the plan is being led by the best performing firms in the industry. The 
major steel producers were on board from the beginning and tried to involve their rivals. The 
China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) officially endorsed the scheme, and its chairman, 
who is also president of Anshan (a big Chinese steel-maker), said he would persuade other 
Chinese producers to join the scheme. Industry leaders explicitly motivated the decision to 
keep data private with the need to obtain the maximum involvement. The chief executive of 
US Steel, the US’s largest steel company, said that he feared that many steel-makers would 
not take part in the scheme if they knew they had to publish their data and expose themselves 
to criticism. 
The data collection plan is not the first example of collaboration in the steel industry to 
improve the collective environmental performance. A “State-of-the-art Clean Technologies 
Handbook”, containing a detailed list of sustainability practices for steel plants, has been 
developed by the industry and made publicly available to all members (APP, 2008). The 
World Steel Association declared that new technical benchmarks will be identified through 
the emission data collection plan and subsequently shared among participants. The association 
also announced a R&D plan with the aim to discover breakthrough technologies in steel 
production and to revamp and improve the energy efficiency of outdated steel plants (WSA, 
2008a). A general cooperative climate in the steel industry facilitated all these initiatives. 
Increased steel use in China and other emerging economies has led to a renaissance in 
18 
industry profitability over the last years; the reduction of excess capacity has eased the 
pressure on prices; recent mergers and acquisitions (e.g. the merger of Mittal Steel and 
Arcelor) increased industry concentration and smoothed the path to collaboration among 
firms (Marsh, 2008). 
In October 2008 the World Steel Association reported on the ongoing completion of 
phase 1 of data collection (with 56% of the participants, representing 178 sites, having 
provided the data). On this occasion Ian Christmas, the Director General of the World Steel 
Association Director General, declared: 
“[W]e will be establishing a very powerful and detailed database to help our members 
know where they are in relation to the averages either in their region or the world. Every 
steel company and steel-producing country is at a different starting point. Our vision is 
that over time there will be a convergence towards best practice and this will have a 
material impact on our global emissions… [T]here should be a set of parallel 
agreements between steel companies, national steel associations and their respective 
national or regional governments which set out commitments on improvements on steel 
intensity for the future” (WSA, 2008b). 
These statements made explicit the objective of the World Steel Association to make the 
participants converge on a set of best practices and to back the industry’s lobbying efforts to 
avoid costly state interventions. These objectives are further evidence of the nature the plan, 
which can be analysed as a stimulus to poor performers to curb their emissions and protect the 
profitability of the industry as a whole. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper I have addressed the problem of why many socially-responsible firms converge 
on some limited set of social practices instead of developing their own solutions to the social 
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issues with which they have to deal. It is hard to reconcile this convergence with the idea, 
common in the CSR literature, that CSR practices allow companies to achieve above-average 
returns, since extra-performance requires some sort of differentiation of the firm from its 
competitors. I suggest that at least three theories can explain convergence of CSR practices. 
(1) Herd behaviour: focal firms initiate innovative social practices and then are 
imitated by their rivals. The imitation process starts because rivals are uncertain about which 
practices are most appropriate or because the focal firms are credited with superior 
information about the best way to address a given social issue. 
(2) Institutional isomorphism: regulators, NGOs and other stakeholders define what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour and exert pressures on firms to conform. The pressures 
consist of the social and economic sanctions that the stakeholders can apply to offenders.  
(3) Strategic cooperation: when the stakeholders are unable to observe the actual social 
performance of firms, single offenders can damage the reputation of their reference group. To 
avoid generalised penalties, industry participants will try to create informal regulatory 
mechanisms, pressure their peers to conform, and share information with them in order to 
facilitate imitation. Management standards or other acknowledged social practices will be 
useful reference points. 
These theories are based on different constructs and lead to different empirical 
predictions. Table 1 summarises the main predictions considered. 
Table 1 about here 
All three theories are useful to understand why firms converge in their social practices. 
One theory or another may be better in explaining different practices. It is also possible that 
all the factors underlying the three theories sometimes concur to shape the behaviour of firms. 
For example, a private self-regulation scheme may be initiated by industry players (strategic 
cooperation) and then, because of problems of collective action, the players may decide to 
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involve external stakeholders in the scheme or, alternatively, to adhere to schemes already 
proposed by the stakeholders (institutional isomorphism); finally, the scheme may undergo a 
typical two-stage process, where a first group of leading firms adheres to it from the 
beginning and latecomers get on board because they feel the pressure of competitive 
mimetism (herd behaviour). Such two-stage processes have been documented across a variety 
of contexts, from the adoption of multidivisional organizational structures (M-forms) to the 
diffusion of total quality management (TQM) among firms (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 
1993). Further research is needed on the situational factors that can produce one or another 
type of convergence, such as the particular social issue to be addressed, the strenght of the 
focal industry association, the traits of the institutional environment, and so on. 
It is also important to remember that not all firms converge. There are some well-
known firms that have been building their unique ways to serve stakeholder needs for years 
and have strenuously protected their innovations from imitation. Ben & Jerry’s, Body Shop 
and other successful firms are convincing cases. It is therefore tempting to see the firms that 
limit themselves to adopt standard social practices as instances of the attitude that Porter and 
Kramer (2006) dubbed “responsive”. According to these authors, there are two kinds of CSR. 
(a) Strategic CSR: firms that adopt this approach want to go beyond best practices and 
do things differently from competitors. 
(b) Responsive CSR: firms that adopt this approach want only to create goodwill and 
improve relationships with stakeholders; their typical attitudes include acting as a good 
corporate citizen and trying to mitigate the adverse effects on society of their business 
activities. 
The distinction between strategic and responsive CSR is relevant to the questions 
addressed in this paper but assimilates strategic behaviour with the quest for uniqueness. On 
the other hand, we have seen that socially-responsible firms may be strategically motivated to 
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avoid uniqueness in order to allow imitation by sub-performing peers. A firm can even 
strategically decide to avoid adopting an efficient practice because the practice would be 
beyond the reach of their peers and would risk disbanding a self-regulatory scheme. As far as 
CSR is concerned, strategy does not necessarily mean trying to outperform competitors. We 
suggest that CSR can be more simply divided into two categories. 
(a) Divergent CSR: firms try to obtain competitive advantage through superior social 
performance or differentiation in satisfying stakeholder requests; the firms work to preserve 
their uniqueness and to build barriers to imitation. 
(b) Convergent CSR: firms do not use social performance or stakeholder satisfaction as 
a means to achieve competitive advantage; they focus on social practices that are both 
efficient and legitimate, and are open to collaboration with rivals in order to avert shared risks 
or to defend the reputation of their industry or their reference group. 
This distinction casts some light on the difficult problem of measuring the financial 
returns from CSR. A rich literature tried to ascertain a link between the social performance of 
firms and their financial performance. The outcomes of this literature are usually deemed 
inconclusive: the link seems inexistent or weak at best (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et 
al., 2003). Now, this is exactly what one should expect when convergence of firms on non-
differentiating social practices is the norm. Socially-responsible firms with a convergent CSR 
attitude can create social value and may be able to get a share of it, but in general their rivals 
will be able to do the same. No effect on stock performance or profit differentials should 
therefore be observable. Research on the social-financial performance link could produce 
more interesting results if the studies were focused on identifiable segments of firms that 
adopt divergent CSR practices. Research should also analyse in what cases divergent CSR is 
more probable to be profitable, taking into consideration factors at both the firm level (such as 
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resources and competencies) and the industry level (such as industry structure or state of 
rivalry). 
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TABLE 1: Comparison of theories 
 HERD BEHAVIOUR INSTITUTIONAL 
ISOMORPHISM 
STRATEGIC 
COOPERATION 
Leading players Innovative firms Stakeholders Firms exposed to public 
crises and stakeholder 
backlash 
Driving force of 
diffusion 
Information externalities Legitimacy-seeking Reputation externalities 
Standard chosen because 
it is... 
Best practice Legitimate practice A reference point 
attainable by all peers 
Knowledge Private, obtained through 
observation of outputs 
Created and spread by 
institutional actors 
Shared among peers 
Firm relations Competitive Competitive Collaborative 
 
 
